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DISVALUES IN NATURE 
1. Disvalues and values 
To accentuate the positive one can eliminate the negative. A touchstone 
for any theory of truth is its theory of error; a theory of value needs to han-
dle disvalue. Philosophers, lately exercised about values in nature, have not 
yet much asked about disvalues there. They have also cautioned against 
committing an alleged naturalistic fallacy. The usual version, the positive 
naturalistic fallacy, argues from is to ought. Nature is described such and 
such a way; that is a good thing and ought to be so. But, we are warned, 
"natural" does not imply "right." The unusual version, the negative 
naturalistic fallacy, argues to ought not. Nature is such and such a way; this 
ought not to be so. 
This locates disvalue in nature, but on what grounds? Possibly there is 
a suppressed, implicit premise: I (or other humans) choose for good reasons 
supporting human welfare to disvalue this matter of natural fact. Now the 
conclusion does follow, given my premises. But these are only "my" 
premises. Take away my preferences and reasons, and there is no disvalue in 
nature. Opportunistic humans operate as a preference sieve through a 
booming, buzzing confusion, a kaleidoscopic churn where no event is of 
value or disvalue of itself. But assume our human outlook, and we cannot 
avoid valuing some and disvaluing other events in nature. 
Often there is a stronger claim. A certain natural condition is bad, 
whether or not any humans are around. When I come on scene, I can 
evaluate it so. I may also suffer from this preexisting disvalue; I ought to 
remedy it if I can. So "my" premises are describing the natural case; my 
subjective preferences are registering an objective disvalue. In this latter 
case, no fallacy is committed; to the contrary truth is discovered, only, alas, 
unhappy truth. 
Charles Darwin exclaimed that the process is "clumsy, wasteful, 
blundering, low, and horribly cruel."1 John Stuart Mill cursed nature as an 
"odious scene of violence."2 Thomas Huxley admonished, "Let us under-
stand, once for all, that the ethical process of society depends, not on im-
itating the cosmic process, still less on running away from it, but in com-
bating it."3 George Williams insists, "The process and products of evolu-
tion are morally unacceptable and act in opposition to the ethical progress 
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of humanity. . . . What is, in the biological world, normally ought not."4 
These seem to be judgments disvaluing objective natural history. If true, 
there could prove little cause for biological conservation out of respect for 
nature. 
Disvalue might be discovered in natural products oblivious to the 
systemic processes. If the disvalue comes only by human preferences, origins 
are irrelevant. But nature is processes as much as products. Possibly, a 
disvaluable or valueless process has occasionally produced valuable pro-
ducts, though it would be anomalous if there were a longstanding, high 
statistical correlation between such a disvaluable process and its valuable 
products. When valuing nature it is difficult to separate the evolutionary 
past from the ecological present, and we need to connect both with the 
ethical future. 
An intermediate position is that evolution leads sometimes to good, 
sometimes to bad things, and that on balance this is a zero sum game. The 
goods and bads cancel each other out, like heads and tails when tossing a 
coin. Or the dice might be loaded, either toward values or disvalues. 
Another position, only seemingly intermediate, holds that the evolu-
tionary processes and products are devoid of value. This does not mean that 
each result lies still within the category of valuation, their average hitting 
the scale at zero. Rather, evolution is entirely off the value scale. Hamlet 
mused, "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."5 
More accurately, preferring makes it so. Disvalue is as added as value; the 
naked term is non-value, but even that term backs into nature pejoratively, 
because it defines a thing by finding entities absent value. Natural things—if 
we can find ourselves up to this thought experiment—just are, neither pres-
ent nor absent value; rather they lie outside the domain of value (and 
therefore outside nonvalue and disvalue categories), until humans or other 
conscious valuers arrive and ignite values or disvalues. 
We can say that natural processes and products always have the stand-
ing possibility of valuation (or disvaluation), but that is to categorize them 
in terms of possibilities when humans come on scene. Whether such a stand-
ing possibility can be retroactively posited as some real potential there ab-
sent humans is doubtful. True enough, we cannot formulate the question 
whether there is value in nature independently of human experience; but can 
we formulate a question that reaches outside of human experience? Notice 
that both those who do and those who do not find or assign value, disvalue, 
or nonvalue, think they can describe what is really there or not there, out-
side of the perceptions in the eye of the human beholder. Even the null-
value view thinks to know what categories are absent in nature. 
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Sometimes, we view from our human niche, when we value timber and 
disvalue wildfire that destroys it. But sometimes we wish a view from no 
niche, that of an ideal Earth-observer. This need not be absolute, but it will 
be regional or global. This view is made with our human perceptual and 
cognitive equipment, but we can partially at least distinguish what we see 
from how we are able to see it. 
Notice carefully that the appropriate evaluative category is not nature's 
moral goodness, for there are no moral agents in nonhuman nature. The ap-
propriate category is one or more kinds of nonmoral goodness, better called 
nature's value. Such value is not to be mapped by projection from culture, 
much less from human moral systems within culture. It may be that we 
humans, who are moral agents, ought or ought not to imitate this process; 
such decision and action will be a moral matter. But the evaluation of 
nature is not yet moral. Nature is a-moral but that does not imply either a-
value or neg-value. That may be where the suspected fallacy lies. 
One appropriate category on Earth will be its biological goodness, the 
extent to which the natural system is pro-life, prolific. We must evaluate 
phenomena such as: the achievement of diversity and complexity out of 
simplicity, the mixture of order and contingency, the nomothetic and the 
idiographic, autonomy and interdependence, individualism and communi-
ty, endurance through struggle. None of these results can be called moral. 
Rather, these are creative activities. They may have resultant worth. 
If we ask whether all natural things are made for human benefit (either 
by divine design or natural selection), then it is clear that the answer is that 
they are not. From this perspective, many things in nature will have no 
value or disvalue. For Homo sapiens some things will prove of value, 
likeliest some found in our evolved niche, if we have one. Or if we have 
rebuilt our niche culturally, valuable things will be those that we use as 
natural resources, remaking them into instruments of culture. But if we ask 
whether natural things are well made in and by themselves, an answer still 
needs to be sought. 
Philosophers have been chary and fastidious about granting objective 
value in nature, but they have often been quite willing to allege objective 
disvalue in nature. But by parity of reasoning, those willing to grant objec-
tive disvalue must also consider objective value. Indeed, we shall argue that 
such disvalues point to values more evidently there. The view of nature that 
results is not value negative, much less value neutral; it embeds values in 
biotic community. The argument must follow opposites in conflict and 
resolution, and this will require a series of gestalt switches, finding out what 
is actually going on in nature, evaluating it prima facie and revaluating it at 
more depth. 
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Also, take caution against forgetting the pluralism in nature. There are 
myriad sorts of things and they are differently made. 
2. Predation 
There is quite a list of candidate disvalues. One is predation. In-
disputably, for a prey animal, it is bad to be eaten; death results. If a tiger 
eats a human, we are horrified. And if a tiger eats a monkey? The monkey 
screams, and "nature, red in tooth and claw"6 has seemed quite tragic. 
Richard Dawkins concludes that Tennyson's famous phrase "sums up our 
modern understanding of natural selection admirably." All organisms are 
"like successful Chicago gangsters."7 Steve Sapontzis finds predation 
lamentable: "Where we can prevent predation without occasioning as much 
or more suffering than we would prevent, we are obligated to do so."8 
These judgments, made from a human perspective, are judgments from the 
perspective of any prey and judgments about processes deeply embedded in 
ecosvstems. 
The disvalue to the prey is, however, a value to the predator, and, with 
a systemic turn, perspectives change. The violent death of the hunted means 
life to the hunter. There is not value loss so much as value capture; nutrient 
materials and energy flow from one life stream to another, with selective 
pressures to be efficient about the transfer. The pains of the prey are matched 
by the pleasures of the predator. Should we register the amounts of each to 
compute the net? Or is the hedonistic criterion perhaps not the most rele-
vant one? We need to ask what biological achievements result from preda-
tion? 
The wolf is not a big, bad wolf; it is one of the most handsome animals 
on Earth. Many wish to reintroduce wolves to Yellowstone. In Africa, 
tourists most want to see the big cats. Florida school children chose the 
lithe, supple panther as their state animal. We admire the muscle and pow-
er, the sentience and skills that could only have evolved in predation. Such 
aesthetic experience is in the eye of the human beholder, but the biological 
achievements are objective in cat and wolf. Are these good products of a bad 
process? Or does something about the creative process require predation? 
Autotrophs synthesize their own food; heterotrophs eat something 
else. Could we have had a world with only flora, no fauna? Possibly not, 
since in a world in which things are assembled something has to disassemble 
them for recycling. In any case, no one thinks that a mere floral world 
would be of more value than a world with fauna also. In a floral world, 
there would be no one to think. Heterotrophs must be built on autotrophs, 
and no autotrophs are sentient or cerebral. 
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Could there have been only plant-eating fauna, only grazers, no 
predators? Possibly, though probably there never was such a world, since 
predation preceded photosynthesis. Even grazers are predators of a kind, 
though what they eat does not suffer. Again, an Earth with only herbivores 
and no omnivores or carnivores would be impoverished. The animal skills 
demanded would be only a fraction of those that have resulted in actual 
zoology—no horns, no fleet-footed predators or prey, no fine-tuned 
eyesight and hearing, no quick neural capacity, no advanced brains. 
Nor are all benefits to the predators. The individual prey, eaten, loses 
all; but the species may gain as the population is regulated, as selection for 
better skills at avoiding predation takes place, and the prey not less than the 
predator will gain in sentience, mobility, cognitive and perceptual powers. 
Being eaten is not always a bad thing, even from the perspective of the prey 
species. The predator depends on a continuing prey population; they have 
entwined destinies. 
A rattlesnake has fangs—weapons—and people and animals can get 
hurt by them. That is clearly a disvalue, if bitten. But fangs are of value to 
the snake, and their disvalue is close-coupled with value. Indeed, in the 
systemic picture, fangs are teeth, teeth belong in the food chains by which 
animals eat. Sometimes animals use the same tools that secure food also as 
weapons to protect themselves against being eaten. There is nothing in-
herently disvaluable about teeth, including incisors or canines. A human 
eating an apple is no more, no less ungodly than a snake eating a mouse. A 
photosynthetic world would be a largely immobile world. Some species 
must sit around and soak up sunlight; other species will capture this value to 
fuel mobility. Still other species will rise higher on the trophic pyramid, 
funded by capturing resources from below for greater achievements in sen-
tience, cognition, and mobility. 
We humans stand in this tradition, omnivores over most of our 
timespan. Our ancestors were hunters until the advent of domestication and 
agriculture a few thousand years ago; even in domestication meat eating 
continues. Perhaps we ought to kill food animals humanely, perhaps we 
even ought now to stop eating them. But meanwhile we face the paradox 
that without predation in our past we should not be here to deliberate the 
question at all. 
A world without blood would be poorer, but a world without blood-
shed would be poorer too. Among other things, it would be a world without 
humans—not that humans now cannot be vegetarians but that the evolution 
of humans would never have taken place. We are beginning to see that 
disvalues are often subtly transmuted into values, especially if we transpose 
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the question from one of human preferences into one about systemic pro-
cesses. 
3. Parasitism 
Alexander Skutch concludes, "After long pondering, I believe that I 
can define good and evil in terms to which even a biologist . . . can hardly 
take exception. . . . The great evil of life is parasitism."9 Parasitism is 
predation minus what we just admired. The lofty power, sentience, cogni-
tion, and locomotion are gone; the degenerate parasite just sucks nutrients 
out of the host and cripples it. Parasites do not even contribute the 
photosynthetic energy collection supplied in plants. Parasites often lose 
skills they formerly had—eyes, wings, even their brains. As humans we 
dislike parasites, but the judgment here is not mere human preference. It is 
based on objective facts recognizing a bad feature in a generally positive 
evolutionary system. "Parasitism has taken its tremendous toll of life with 
scarcely any return that we can see; it has led to retrogression rather than to 
progress. Hence we may call it the greatest evil of life."10 
Ichneumon wasps in larval stages are parasites that slowly excavate 
caterpillars from within. Stephen Jay Gould reels from the grisly business, 
"I suspect that nothing evokes greater disgust in most of us than slow 
destruction of a host by an internal parasite—gradual ingestion, bit by bit, 
from the inside."11 Gould concludes, rightly, that nature is nonmoral; the 
wasps cannot be faulted, nor can we morally censure the system they in-
habit. But have we a disvalue? Gould finds himself bewildered and is unsure 
whether he can ask, much less answer, the question. E. O. Wilson remarks 
that much parasitism is an "evolutionary sink" the end of which is "a state 
of abject dependence on the host species."12 Notice, though, that seldom 
does the system as a whole degenerate. The parasite that loses skills borrows 
skills that remain in the host. 
But contemporary parasitology questions the extent to which parasites 
are either degenerate or detrimental to their hosts. Their evolution is often 
doubtfully to be termed "regressive"; the exchange of free-living skills 
achieves less evident but biochemically sophisticated skills. Arthur W. 
Jones concludes, "Parasite life cycles are extremely ingenious.... Parasites 
may be, not less, but more evolutionarily progressive than their hosts."13 
Much of this is microscopic; most of it is invisible to the uneducated 
observer. 
Most parasites do not harm their hosts and many are beneficial. We 
could almost have predicted this, had we listened to evolutionary theory, 
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since the success of a parasite is closely tied to that of its host species. There 
is much evidence (and some counterevidence) that in the most advanced 
parasite-host coevolution the parasites show minimal pathogenesis. A. C. 
Allison concludes, "Long co-evolution of vertebrate hosts and parasites 
results in infections of low virulence."14 The ill-adapted parasite species 
slays its host species and goes extinct; better-adapted parasites co-exist with 
their hosts, and the best-adapted will benefit their hosts at the species and 
even at the individual level. Overvirulence to the host decreases the 
parasite's chances of survival; a parasite can increase its chances by 
benefiting its host organism. Parasites also regulate animal populations. 
 There is obvious disvalue in much parasitism; this may be, on average, a 
glitch in the system. But it is almost as clear that virulence is not intrinsic to 
parasitism and that the systemic selective pressures are often positive 
even when the trend is sometimes locally negative. "Parasitism, one of life's 
great phenomena, possesses a quality of goodness that has largely been 
overlooked."15 
Parasitism is a subroutine in a larger value-capture system. It cannot be 
a bad thing for an organism to depend on another for skills or metabolisms 
it lacks, else humans (who cannot photosynthesize) eating plants (which 
can) would be a parasitic evil. All heterotrophs of spectacular evolutionary 
achievement live in "abject dependence" on plants. Meanwhile, it might be 
a bad thing if some life forms took degenerating routes. No one wants to 
say that there are no disvalues in nature; but we do want to keep them in 
perspective in the fuller picture. The whole idea of parasitism is conceptually 
parasitic on values elsewhere present and flourishing enough to be parasi-
tized. The disvalue, parasitism, is privative on some value, autonomous life, 
but all life is interdependent. There could be no world composed entirely of 
parasites, taking in each other's values, so to speak. However much 
disvalue parasitism introduces, there must be positive value in excess of it, 
else the parasite could not parasitize. 
4. Selfishness 
Selfishness is rightfully lamented in humans but immoral selfishness 
can be a disvalue in nature only if there is moral agency present. Who or 
what are such moral agents? Monkeys? Snakes? Trees? Mountains? Light-
ning bolts? Evolution? Genes? Systemic nature? Every organism is full of 
"selfish genes," Richard Dawkins tells us, the only kind of genes there are. 
Why does George Williams disvalue evolutionary nature so? Because it 
"can honestly be described as a process for maximizing short-sighted 
selfishness."16 But if there is no moral agency present, if genes cannot be 
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selfish in any sense that we disvalue in human ethics, that is not an 
"honest" (= accurate) description after all. Moreover, evolution has no 
"sight" and cannot be faulted for being short-sighted. What seems to be 
claimed is that there are processes in evolution that moral agents, when they 
appear, will disvalue—rectify or repudiate—in their own cultural life. The 
alleged selfishness is said to be located in one organism's looking out after 
its own interests or in assisting relatives and offspring, when it shares genes. 
Though there is no moral selfishness in nature, there are selves—bio-
logical organismic identities to be preserved (not to be confused with psycho-
logical egos). Such a self-impulse cannot in itself be a disvalue. Quite to the 
contrary, this self-impulse just is the life impulse, the principal carrier of 
biological value. An organismic self is not a bad thing, nor is the defense of it. 
Can we describe the natural system more accurately and less pejorative-
ly? The system evolves organisms that attend to their immediate somatic 
needs (food, shelter, metabolism) and that reproduce themselves in the very 
next generation. In the birth-death-birth-death system a series of 
replacements is required. The organism must do this, it has no options; it is 
"proper" for the organism to do this (Latin proprium, one's own proper 
characteristic). Somatic defense and genetic transmission are the only con-
servation activities possible to most organisms; they are necessary for all, 
and they must be efficient about it. 
If there is some disvalue, this must lie in an overextension or aberration 
of the self-impulse. When a subordinate monkey relinquishes a feeding site 
to a dominant, the dominant may be said to have "selfishly" taken over. Or 
males may "selfishly" dominate females or defend territories. Such 
behavior, says Williams, is "not only selfish in some theoretical sense but 
patently pernicious. Only the morally and intellectually dishonest could 
label it otherwise."17 But if we strike out the negative moral overtones and 
replace this with positive self-preservation, what is going on? The monkey 
with the superior genes gets fed and bred; the monkey with the inferior 
genes does not, or at least not first. What is so disvaluable about that? 
Should it rather be the other way round—that the inferior genes get 
nourished and propagated, the superior ones not so? 
If we cast the event in terms of values defended, what is of value here 
(the superior genome) gets transmitted, maintained through feeding and 
breeding, while what is of relative disvalue gets selected against. There is no 
moral agency at issue; what is at stake is value that is self-actualized. To ask 
these monkeys to behave as altruistic humans misunderstands the events 
and misvalues them accordingly. Read out the immorality, and the picture 
looks different. Take off the dark glasses and put on clearer ones. It is a 
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category mistake to describe (and censure) what goes on in wild nature with 
terms borrowed from culture and projected onto nature. There is nothing 
here particularly disvaluable, which moral agents, when they come, will 
want to deplore and rectify. The alleged selfishness is really the conserva-
tion of value intrinsic to the organism in the only manner possible and ap-
propriate to it. 
All such contests at feeding and reproduction are endured for "selfish" 
advantage by males or females only in a problematic sense, since the 
somatic individual soon dies anyway. A better way of interpreting events is 
that the contest is to share genes. It is self-defense in one sense, but if males 
and females spend time, energy, and effort to reproduce, this is self-
sacrificing in another sense. By those who resolve to see everything through 
selfish lenses, this will (rather confusingly) be called selfishness again, seen 
from the nonmoral genetic level. But we get a much clearer picture of what 
is going on if we interpret this as values being transmitted over generations. 
Although the organism is engaged in a short-range reproduction of its 
kind, the systemic processes are neither short-range nor do they selfishly 
maximize only one kind. The system is 3.5 billion years old; it has steadily 
produced new arrivals, replacements, and elaborations of kinds, going from 
zero to five (or ten) million species, through five (or ten) billion turnover 
species in a kaleidoscopic panorama. Any particular organism, in the 
subroutines of this system, actualizes its own values and transmits these to 
the next generation (with variations). That is all any one organism has the 
capacity to do, a capacity of critical value. The result is a quite dramatic 
story, not just a long, long chain of "patently pernicious" short-sighted 
selfishness. The value account seems quite descriptively plausible, not at all 
"morally and intellectually dishonest." 
Of course, when humans pass over into culture, they may wish to tran-
scend or revise the now-relaxed processes of natural selection. A good thing 
in nature may not be a good thing in culture, and vice versa. We certainly do 
not want to turn to amoral nature for templates with which to judge moral 
events in culture. That too is a category mistake. Interhuman ethics is 
nowhere to be educated by watching monkeys, or wildflowers, or bolts of 
lightning. 
5. Randomness 
"Nature does nothing in vain. Natura nihil agit frustra"18 But, con-
trary to Sir Thomas Browne's famous claim, some biologists find that 
nature does nothing with any bent toward value. Physical and chemical laws 
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operate there, as do some biological regularities, such as survival of the fit-
test, but the system is mostly just contingent. Unrelated and probabilistically-
related causal lines impinge, resulting in lucky and unlucky events. When an 
elk, crashing through the forest, accidentally steps on the nest of a 
thrush, crushing the young, an event of disvalue has occurred, without 
redeeming construction of value. The elk gains nothing by the accident; 
had it stepped elsewhere nothing would have been really different for it. 
The thrush has only lost. Windblown seeds fall, some on rock or un-
suitable ground. Some get eaten. Some sprout to get killed by a frost; some 
die when the rains fail. 
Some judge this to be local disvalue in a null-valued system. A random 
event generator lies outside the domain of value generation, even though its 
output is accidentally valuable or disvaluable on rare occasions. But when 
we place local bad luck into the larger system, is this systemically a disvalue? 
The organism by its genetic programming, instincts, perceptions, and con-
ditioned learning modifies its exposure to luck and acts as a preference 
sieve, sometimes but not always accumulating the lucky upstrokes and 
discarding the unlucky downstrokes. Should we value the capacity to catch 
or discard, while cursing the world of contingency? 
But that is to value the retention side as though the supply side were not 
logically and empirically necessary. It does not seem possible for the world 
to be otherwise if there is to be autonomy, freedom, adventure, success, 
achievement, emergents, openness, surprise, and idiographic particularity. 
The feet of free-ranging elk cannot be bound. We inhabit a world where 
luck is one of the required ingredients in the arrival, construction, and con-
servation of value. There is a combination of deterministic and oppor-
tunistic processes, a mixture of vitality with necessity and possibility. We 
are not dealing with probabilities and random walks so much as with 
developing story lines. 
Frances Crick complains that biology has no "elegance." Organisms 
evolve happenstance structures and wayward functions that have no more 
overarching logic than the layout of the Manhattan subway system.19 
Stephen Jay Gould insists that the panda's thumb is evolutionary tinkering 
and that orchids are "jury-rigged."20 Evolution works with what is at hand, 
and makes something new out of it. 
But what is so disvaluable about that? The achievements of evolution 
do not have to be optimal to be valuable; and if a reason that they are not 
optimal is that they had to be reached historically along story lines, it is 
more valuable to have history plus value as storied achievement than to 
have "elegant" optimal value solutions without history, autonomy, or 
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adventure. Organismic vitality is better than regimented simplicity. The 
elegance of the thirty-two crystal classes is not to be confused with the grace 
of life lived in the midst of perpetual perishing. 
How global is this contingency? Viewing natural selection systemically, 
some hardnosed scientists are reluctant to see any value increase, because 
their theory, as usually interpreted, does not entitle them to see any. Despite 
the use of "better" with "adaptation," the theory predicts only survivors 
and leaves entirely open whether the survivors have progressively more 
worth. If the environment that species track is drifting, then they do not 
progress toward anything, they just track drift—buffeted about by aimless 
geomorphic processes. The only outcome that natural selection can pro-
mote is capacity to survive, an independent variable with regard to increas-
ing complexity or diversity. Like a rotating kaleidoscope, there is change 
without development. 
The biological panorama, more or less packed since Cambrian times, is 
a scene of steady turnover, but later-coming grasses or crustaceans are not 
any better than earlier, extinct ones; they are just different. Indeed, in 
climates growing colder or drier fewer species may live there later than did 
before. There are fewer dinosaurs now than in Cretaceous times, fewer 
birds than in Pleistocene times. Gould insists, "We are the accidental result 
of an unplanned process . . .  the fragile result of an enormous concatena-
tion of improbabilities, not the predictable product of any definite 
process."21 There may result "chance riches,"22 but the system is without 
value heading. Note that this claim is intended to describe objective natural 
history. Both descriptively and axiologically, there is only luck. 
But something is increasingly learned across evolutionary history: how 
to make more kinds and more complex kinds. This may be a truth about 
natural history, even if neo-Darwinism is incompetent to say much about 
how this happens. Cold and warm fronts come and go, so do ice ages. There 
are rock cycles, orogenic uplift, erosion, and uplift again. But there is no 
natural selection there, nothing is competing, nothing is surviving, nothing 
has adapted fit, and biology seems different. All those climatological and 
geomorphological agitations continue in the Pleistocene period more or less 
like they did in the Precambrian, but the life story is not the same all over 
again. Where once there were no species, now there are five to ten million. 
It seems evident that, on average and environmental conditions permitting, 
the numbers of life forms start low and end high. 
J. W. Valentine concludes for marine environments: "A major 
Phanerozoic trend among the invertebrate biota of the world's shelf and 
epicontinental seas has been towards more and more numerous units at all 
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levels of the ecological hierarchy. ... the biosphere has become a splitter's 
paradise"23 There is "a gradually rising average complexity."24 The story of 
terrestrial life is even more impressive, because the land environment is 
more challenging. Reptiles can cope in a broader spectrum of humidity con-
ditions than amphibians. Mammals can cope in a broader spectrum of 
temperature conditions than reptiles. Genetic and enzymatic control is sur-
passed by neural networks and brains; there are increases in sentient capaci-
ty, locomotion, acquired learning, communication, language acquisition, 
and in manipulation. 
Francisco J. Ayala concludes, "Progress has occurred in nontrivial 
senses in the living world because of the creative character of the process of 
natural selection."25 Theodosious Dobzhansky agrees, "Evolution as a 
whole doubtless had a general direction, from simple to complex, from 
dependence on to relative independence of the environment, to greater and 
greater autonomy of individuals, greater and greater development of sense 
organs and nervous systems conveying and processing information about 
the state of the organism's surroundings, and finally greater and greater 
consciousness."26 
What the random walk omits is the cybernetic, hereditary capacity of 
organisms to acquire, store, and transmit new information over historical 
time. Organisms start simple and some of them end up complex; there are 
trends over longer-range time scales because something is at work addi-
tionally to tracking drifting environments. The life process is drifting 
through an information search, locking onto discoveries. With such a con-
clusion the value question returns. If the system does produce both diversity 
and complexity, randomness is not the systemic story, however important it 
may be in the subplots. 
6. Blindness 
Williams, who thinks evolutionary nature selfish and pernicious, also 
thinks it blind. This follows from randomness on the cutting edge. Varia-
tions bubble up from the genetic level, as organisms compete for a place in 
drifting environments. Those few variations that are accidentally useful are 
selected for; the most, worthless, are discarded; some, to which even 
natural selection is blind, since they produce no differential survival rates, 
remain and result in genetic drift. Zig here, zag there, organisms stumble 
onto a life program. "The evolutionary process is immensely powerful and 
oppressive, . . .  it is abysmally stupid."27 "Clumsy" and "blundering" 
were Darwin's words. 
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Now evolution has no sight, nor is it deliberate. Maybe it is not elegant. 
Evolution is a problem-solving process. Is this unguided, inept, disval-
uable? The genetically originated novelties are formed in a shuffle that, 
while in some sense blind to the organismic needs, is far from chaotic. 
Only those variations are tested and selected that are more or less func-
tional. The organism typically only probes the nearby space for possible 
directions of development. Mutators and animutators increase or trim the 
mutation rates as a function of population stresses.28 Repair mechanisms 
snip out certain genetic errors, and thus eliminate some variation. The 
genetic program has the capacity to "reject" some of the random recom-
binants on the basis of information already present in the genetic coding. 
Individual genetic sets are adept at pumping out their own disorder. But 
they do not pump out all novelty; that would cease evolutionary develop-
ment and lead to extinction. 
Contemporary geneticists are insisting that we misperceive this process 
if we think of it as blind. It is not deliberated in the conscious sense; but it is 
cognitive, somewhat in the way in which computers, likewise without felt 
experience, can run problem-solving programs. There is a vast array of 
sophisticated enzymes to cut, splice, digest, rearrange, mutate, reiterate, 
edit, correct, translocate, invert, and truncate particular gene sequences. 
There is much redundancy (multiple, variant copies of a gene in multi-gene 
families) that shields the species from accidental loss of a beneficial gene 
and provides flexibility on which these enzymes can work. 
John H. Campbell concludes, "Cells are richly provided with special 
enzymes to tamper with DNA structure," enzymes that biologists are ex-
tracting for genetic engineering. But this "engineering" is already going on 
in spontaneous nature. "Gene-processing enzymes also engineer com-
parable changes in genes in vivo. . . . We have discovered enzymes and en-
zyme pathways for almost every conceivable change in the structure of 
genes. The scope for self-engineering of multigene families seems to be 
limited only by the ingenuity of control systems for regulating these 
pathways." These pathways may have "governors" that are "extraor-
dinarily sophisticated." "Self-governed genes are 'smart' machines in the 
current vernacular sense. Smart genes suggests smart cells and smart evolu-
tion, . . . the promise of radically new genetic and evolutionary 
principles."29 
So far from disparaging the blind groping of genes, computer scientists 
may deliberately seek to imitate a similar process on their unconscious com-
puters. Some sophisticated programs use what are called "genetic 
algorithms."30 Such algorithms involve recombining partial solutions to a 
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problem in order to generate improved solutions. The mode is biological 
with sexual mating and strings of genes on chromosomes that can be shuf-
fled and selected. The underlying metaphor is natural selection. Scientists 
may want to program a computer to search for the optimal set of values to 
solve certain multivalued problems where the values interact with each 
other, such as solving sets of complex mathematical equations, or detecting 
patterns against a background of noise, or scheduling the most effective 
work and meeting times for many dozens of employees in a manufacturing 
plant. 
The computer will generate at random some "bit strings," or "geno-
types," analogous to information coded on chromosomes, which are possi-
ble values in solution. It will test members of the initial population for 
effectiveness as a solution, rank them for their "fitness," and select the fit-
test. The computer will then generate new solutions, stimulating variations 
on the highest ranking ones, inhibiting the lower ranking ones, evaluate the 
new possibilities for their fitness, and put them in competition with the 
previous, partially effective solutions. The computer also "mates" the 
various solutions, that is, cuts up and splices portions of bit strings that 
seem to code the most effective values, and then tests these "offspring" for 
their fitness. It works with coadjusted clusters that probably (but not in-
evitably) move together during crossover. It may vary the "population 
size" of the set of solution values that it mates. It will discard solutions with 
low fitness. 
If two or more sets of solutions begin to appear that have little in com-
mon (widely separated local optima), the computer will preserve these 
multiple solution tracks, but try an occasional cross-mixing of segments 
from the different local optima, some of which will result in offspring that 
have enough fitness to remain in the working population. Such outbreeding 
prevents getting trapped in local optima that are not effective solutions 
globally. The computer will continue with lesser probability (which may be 
varied during the program) occasionally to explore unlikely solutions. Even 
in large and complicated search spaces, genetic algorithms tend to converge 
on solutions that are globally optimal or nearly so. Simple bit strings can en-
code complicated structures, and reiterated transformations of partial solu-
tions have a striking power to improve them. Computer searches that would 
take a computer an estimated billion years, if done completely at random, 
can be accomplished in a few hours. 
Genetic problem solving, then, does not seem so tinkering, jury-rigged, 
and blind. To the contrary, it is remarkably like what some of the smartest 
scientists are doing. Indeed, Herbert A. Simon finds the cutting edges of 
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science itself like natural selection. "Various paths are tried; some are aban-
doned, others are pushed further. Before a solution is found, many paths of 
the maze may be explored. The more difficult and novel the problem, the 
greater is likely to be the amount of trial and error required to find a solu-
tion. At the same time, the trial and error is not completely random or 
blind; it is, in fact, rather highly selective. . . . Human problem solving, 
from the most blundering to the most insightful, involves nothing more 
than varying mixtures of trial and error and slectivity."31 
In nature, the challenge is to get as much versatility coupled with as 
much stability as possible, optimizing twin maxima. There is selective ad-
vantage in using past knowledge where possible; there is advantage in quick-
ly breaking through to something new where required. The dominant/reces-
sive phenomenon in genetics, with a large number of recessive alleles 
waiting in a population, is a way of storing variability that is not usually ex-
pressed in a stable environment, but which is nevertheless there when the en-
vironment shifts.32 
So what is so disvaluable about genetic systems? It seems rather that 
there is valuable problem-solving taking place, and that this is taking place 
whether or not humans are present and doing any evaluating of it. Maybe 
there is more elegance than we first thought. Certainly there are remarkable 
success stories. 
7. Disaster 
Violent forces strike animals, plants, and people; disaster results. 
When human affairs are not touched, we may be unconcerned. Leopold 
mused, while sawing wood, "It was a bolt of lightning that put an end to 
wood-making by this particular oak. We were all awakened, one night in 
July, by the thunderous crash; we realized that the bolt must have hit near 
by, but, since it had not hit us, we all went back to sleep. Man brings all 
things to the test of himself, and this is notably true of lightning."33 If it 
didn't help or hurt me, it didn't help or hurt. 
But we must try to bring things to some test outside ourselves. If the 
test is anthropocentric, all and only those bolts that hit humans or destroy 
what they value have disvalue; after that there is nothing more to be said. 
But this bolt did end the life of the good oak, and is that not a disvalue? In-
dividually yes, but systemically? Lightning, like storms, fires, and floods, is 
statistically regular though individually erratic. At this moment 1,800 
thunderstorms are raging around the globe, about 44,000 each day. Light-
ning is striking the Earth 100 times each second, over 8.6 million times each 
day. Earth is a sometimes turbulent planet.  Is this turbulence, evidently bad 
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when it catches individuals, a disvalue systemically? In 1988, lightning trig-
gered Yellowstone fires that burned catastrophically. On July 21, 1987, 
175-mile-an-hour tornado winds destroyed 15,000 acres in the Teton 
Wilderness of Wyoming. Catastrophic floods rip up riparian zones, as did 
the Big Thompson Flood in Colorado July 31, 1976. Such disruptions 
escalate the unrelated causal lines that tear things up. 
Possibly these violent forces are bad, but there are good ones that over-
come them. Possibly the catastrophic, negative forces are integrated with 
the uniformitarian, positive forces. Floods, windstorms, lightning storms, 
and such violences would be more or less like wildfire in ecosystems, a bad 
thing to individuals burned and in short range, but not really all that bad 
systemically in long range, given nature's restless creativity. Without 
thunderstorms, Earth would lose to the upper atmosphere, in less than an 
hour, the negative electrical charge that produces the atmospheric nitrogen 
upon which most plants depend. Without thunderstorms, playing electric 
charges over the thin hot soup, life could not have originated. Lightning has 
been essential to life.34 
Often such violence comes with enough regularity that life can 
adapt—the oak with the stalwart trunk, ready for the winds; the lodgepole 
pines with their serotinous cones; the ecosystem rejuvenated by fires. Most 
bigscale processes are incremental, like mountain building over millennia; 
life can track such changing environments, often innovating and 
respeciating as it follows geomorphic history. Any event too infrequent to 
be naturally selected for is rare enough to be systemically atypical on most 
Earthen scales. 
Rarely, this violence can come so spasmodically that life is unable to 
cycle onto it. We will then be hard pressed to say that these things can re-
juvenate the ecological succession. Volcanic eruptions come every thousand 
years, and the ecosystem cannot adjust to their intermittent occurrence. 
They just disrupt and the ecosystem recovers as best it can. Even then life 
rejuvenates, value rises from the ashes of disvalue, and the system seems 
prolific once more. The incremental processes are punctuated by catas-
trophes, but nature is never too violent for life to continue—at least never 
yet in the several billion years of Earth history. 
In March 1872 John Muir was in Yosemite Valley when it was struck by 
the Inyo earthquake: "I ran out of my cabin, near the Sentinel Rock, both 
glad and frightened, shouting, 'A noble earthquake!'... a terribly sublime 
and beautiful spectacle"35 "It is delightful to be trotted and dumpled on 
our Mother's mountain knee."36 Later, Muir concludes that the earthquake 
was "wild beauty-making business."  "On the whole, by what at first sight 
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seemed pure confusion and ruin, the landscapes were enriched; for gradual-
ly every talus, however big the boulders composing it, was covered with 
groves and gardens, and made a finely proportioned and ornamental base 
for the sheer cliffs."37 Muir once climbed a Douglas fir to ride out a storm, 
"to take the wind into my pulses and enjoy the excited forest from my 
superb outlook."38 "Many of Nature's finest lessons are to be found in her 
storms."39 
Is this Romanticism at its worst? Not really, for behind the poetry there 
is some botany, life persisting in the midst of its besetting storms. It is ob-
jective fact that the adverse, violent forces in dialectic with the prolific, en-
during forces yield much of the romance of life. The violent forces of nature 
are as much to be celebrated for their creativity as for their destruction. The 
glaciers did carve the most spectacular scenery. Floods cut the valleys. Muir 
insisted that these are "Nature's modes of working toward beauty and 
joy." Volcanism is one of the mountain building forces; and, after the 
violence, life will return. "The cooled lava is forested now. The sun shines 
lovingly upon it, and all is joyous life."40 "Storms of every sort, torrents, 
earthquakes, cataclysms, 'convulsions of nature,' etc., however mysterious 
and lawless at first sight they may seem, are only harmonious notes in the 
song of creation, varied expressions of God's love."41 Muir certainly has an 
intensive faith in natural systems, but such faith is not without some im-
pressive evidence. 
None of this means that, in our culturally rebuilt environments, we 
should not take shelter. After that, "ecstacy is a monster storm."42 
8. Indifference 
In the California desert, April, May, and early June are usually good 
months; with rain and before the heat, the fauna and flora flourish. But 
sometimes the rains fail and the heat comes quickly. Mary Austin, recalls: 
"The quick increase of suns at the end of spring sometimes overtakes birds 
in their nesting and effects a reversal of the ordinary manner of incubation. 
It becomes necessary to keep eggs cool rather than warm. One hot, stifling 
spring in the Little Antelope I had occasion to pass and repass frequently 
the nest of a pair of meadowlarks, located unhappily in the shelter of a very 
slender weed. I never caught them sitting except near night, but at midday 
they stood, or drooped above it, half fainting with pitifully parted bills, be-
tween their treasure and the sun. Sometimes both of them together with 
wings spread and half lifted continued a spot of shade in temperature that 
constrained me at last in a fellow feeling to spare them a bit of canvas for 
permanent shelter."43 
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Barry Lopez recalls, "In the fall of 1973 an October rainstorm created a 
layer of ground ice that, later, muskoxen could not break through to feed. 
Nearly 75 percent of the muskox population in the Canadian Archipelago 
perished that winter."44 Like the meadowlarks, the muskoxen hit bad luck; 
the ice layer was of disvalue to the oxen, the blazing heat of disvalue to the 
larks. This is randomness now with brutal indifference to life. David Hume 
claimed that nature "has no more regard to good above ill than to heat 
above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy."45 Or to 
life above nonlife, he would have added. That indifference can seem true in 
the short range, sometimes even in the long range. Nature doesn't care. 
Is that all there is to be said? Though stressed on these occasions, those 
individuals are satisfactory fits in their ecosystems, and the nature that 
doesn't care is also the nature that provides life support. There the 
meadowlarks are, this pair in trouble, but the species nevertheless flourishes 
both East and West. So what are we to do? Curse this exception or rejoice in 
the usual? The muskoxen, decimated this one winter, continue on the tun-
dra, living on for millennia, so well adapted to a polar existence that this is 
one of the few large animals to have survived the Ice Ages in North 
America. What are we to do: lament the October rainstorm or celebrate the 
tundra that has supported them for several million years? Or both? 
As a species, organisms get selected for those functions and skills that 
enable them to do better in their niches, and what is so uncaring about that? 
Selection for adapted fit is a strange kind of indifference, an odd disvalue. 
The geomorphic, climatic, and even the biological processes can seem to 
have no axiological component at all. They just drift around in a mixture of 
cycles and random walk. Life arises in this geological kaleidoscope but no 
thanks to the elements. But then a different perspective on this earthen stew 
strikes us. This churn of materials, perpetually agitated and irradiated with 
energy, is not the problematic, indifferent resource but the prolific source. 
Against the indifference, we now must counter that the systemic results 
have been prolific, five million species flourishing in myriads of diverse 
ecosystems. 
Maybe nature doesn't "care"; but nature does produce increased 
diversity and complexity. To say that there is nothing but systemic indif-
ference ignores the principal result of natural history. Even if agnostic 
about the statistical worth of the whole, can anyone deny that repeated 
movements within it are prolific, values achieved here and there amidst the 
blooming buzzing confusion of nonvalues and disvalues—and all this objec-
tively so whether or not humans take cognizance of these wild affairs? 
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There is a kind of "promise" in nature, not only in the sense of poten-
tial that is promising but in the reliability in the earthen set-up that is right 
for life. Perhaps the planetary set-up is an accident, but the ongoing after 
the set-up seems to be loaded with fertility. In the short-range all lose, death 
is inevitable; but then again in the long-range life persists, phoenix-like, in 
the midst of its destruction. How much promise do we need? Isn't several 
billion years, with a turnover of several billion species, and a cumulation of 
several million species in almost every nook and cranny of Earth enough? 
Perhaps to say that nature "has regard" for life is the wrong way to phrase 
it; we do not want to ascribe purpose to nature. At the same time, nature is 
a fountain of life. That was the original etymology of "nature," from 
"natans," giving birth—and on Earth nature as birth is nearer the truth 
than nature as sheer indifference. 
It seems a shame now for humans to break that "promise." We may 
not bring ourselves to say that nature is "keeping" any promise; that is not 
the right way to put it. But humans ought not to break what has been so 
promising in nature—not at least without an argument that the values they 
make in culture exceed the values they break in nature. It also seems unin-
formed to turn a philosophically taciturn gaze over all this promising, 
storied natural history and say, "Because I was not there, nor any other 
human, the question of value and disvalue cannot be asked. Argument 
over." 
No argument has been won; none has been begun. Rather, we are not 
really going to be informed about what is going on in nature until we ask 
how value is achieved there, and we are not going to find an answer until we 
see that disvalues are regularly transmuted into values. The indifference to 
be lamented is not that in neg-valued or null-valued nature; the troublesome 
indifference lies in humans so careless about values outside the human sec-
tor. 
9. Waste 
Here an opposite thought strikes us. The nature indifferent to life is also 
ridiculously prolific; now the indifference is manifest not in niggard support 
but in unreasonable fecundity. The teeming kinds are cast forth to die. The 
nature complained against before because it was indifferent to life is com-
plained against now because it produces it too lavishly. This profusion of 
creatures can seem inordinate and senseless, vigorous and horrible. Life is a 
good thing, but must the system waste it so? 
The Salt Creek pupfish overwinters in permanent springs in Death 
Valley, several thousand individuals. With spring runoff, the population ex-
pands a hundred fold, spilling into downstream habitat; the waters abound 
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with juvenile pupfish. Summer comes, the streams dry up, and the popula-
tion is decimated again.46 The proliferation and die-off is extravagant, in-
different reproductive power. Heavy-seeded trees, such as oaks or 
hickories, may produce 200 million acorns or nuts to replace themselves 
once or twice, and light-seeded trees, like cotton woods produce billions.47 A 
pair of robins may produce thirty eggs to replace themselves once. Mother 
Nature seems spendthrift. 
One response to prodigal life is to celebrate it. Thoreau exclaimed: "I 
love to see that Nature is so rife with life that myriads can be afforded to be 
sacrificed and suffered to prey on one another; that tender organizations 
can be so serenely squashed out of existence like pulp,—tadpoles which 
herons gobble up, and tortoises run over in the road . . . With the liability to 
accident, we must see how little account is to be made of it. . . .  Poison is 
not poisonous after all, nor are any wounds fatal."48 This may be ex-
uberance more than waste; the book of Genesis reports that God command-
ed the earth to bring forth "swarms" of creatures and found the prodigious 
result to be very good.49 
Another question to ask is whether all those acorns, hickory nuts, 
seeds, and dead fishes really go to waste? They do, if nothing is of value 
unless and until humans value it. But "waste" is not the way that squirrels, 
blue jays, bears, deer look at acorns and nuts, nor mice the cottonwood 
seeds, nor the way the insect larvae, fungi, and decomposing bacteria ap-
proach the dead fish. One organism's waste is another organism's treasure. 
A muskox, laid waste by the ice sheet, becomes a carcass that benefits 
dozens of scavengers and predators. When something dies, something else 
lives. Nutritious pollens, fruits, and seeds may even evolve to be eaten, if 
this also facilitates dispersion by mobile animals and birds. Seed predators 
are often seed dispersers. 
This alleged "waste" makes trophic pyramids possible. The lavish 
primary production of the grasses supports the ungulates; grass seeds sup-
port the granivorus rodents, whose fecundity supports the coyotes and owls. 
Insects pick up detritus and become food for birds. There is episodic 
surplus—an overkill of muskoxen, a horde of locusts. In odd situations, 
anomalies result. A mountain lioness got into a fold of sheep in Colorado 
laid down ninety-nine in one night's kill. But systemically on average, 
organisms must be efficient. There is capture of valuable nutrients and 
energy, which are recycled through the ecosystem in myriads of pathways. 
Animals partition out and use food resources in sequential stages. All living 
things are marginally pressed for survival; there is little waste. Wherever 
there is available free energy and biomass, a life form typically evolves to 
exploit those resources.  Nature's exuberance is also nature's economy. 
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Truth is, there is not much "waste" in natural systems, though there is ex-
uberance and fecundity. What there is, if immediately a disvalue, is 
systemically transformed into something of value. And all this happens 
regardless of what humans think about it. 
10. Struggle 
The relentless struggle to survive can be supposed a disvalue. Adapted 
fit seems a good thing, but the shadow side is how each organism is doomed 
to eat or be eaten, to stake out what living it can in competition with others. 
Perhaps there is more efficiency than waste, more fecundity than indif-
ference, but each organism is ringed about with competitors and limits, 
forced to do or die. Each is set as much against the world as within it. 
Physical nature, from which are wrested the materials of life, is brute fact 
and brutally there, caring naught and always threatening. Organic nature is 
savage; life preys on life. 
Nature as a jungle does not mean that there are no valuers in the wild; 
it portrays too many claimants contesting scarce worth. Perhaps local 
achievements of value are wrested out of a disvaluable place? Or does the 
truth lie deeper? Perhaps the context of creativity logically and empirically 
requires this context of conflict and resolution. An environment entirely 
hostile would slay us; life could never have appeared within it. An environ-
ment entirely irenic would stagnate us; advanced life, including human life, 
could never have appeared there either. Oppositional nature is the first half 
of the truth; the second is that none of life's heroic quality is possible 
without this dialectical stress. Take away the friction, and would the struc-
tures stand? Would they move? Muscles, teeth, eyes, ears, noses, fins, legs, 
wings, scales, hair, hands, brains—all these and almost everything else 
comes out of the need to make a way through a world that mixes en-
vironmental resistance with environmental conductance. Half the beauty of 
life comes out of endurance through struggle. 
In culture, humans relax these pressures of natural selection, though 
we cannot and do not eliminate the dimension of struggle. If human 
children catch pinkeye, physicians prescribe sodium sulfacetamide; but 
when the bighorns of Yellowstone caught pinkeye, they were left to the 
ravages of the disease. Being sick is a meaningless disvalue in a medically 
skilled culture; but the bighorn herd, surviving the epidemic, is stronger 
now. We count disease in domestic sheep a disvalue, because our resources 
are threatened; we call the veterinarian to cure it. But park officials let half 
the bighorn herd perish, letting nature take its course and valuing more the 
Chlamydia-resistant sheep that would survive, wilder and stronger than had 
they intervened to fix this disvalue in nature. 
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Indeed, from this wilder perspective the domesticated is the degraded. 
Muir contrasts wild sheep, which he admires, "elegant and graceful as a 
deer, every movement manifesting admirable strength and character," with 
the domestic ones, which he despises, stupid "expressionless, like a dull 
bundle of something only half alive."50 If the standard of evaluation is our 
human subjective preferences, fashions in wool, the domesticated breeds can 
be better; but objectively, in natural systems, the wild sheep, honed to its 
strength, alertness, and endurance by the struggle for survival, is the more 
valuable. From this perspective, struggle is no disvalue (even though many 
sheep lose); it is the key to value achieved. Indeed, it is difficult to envision 
any of the properties admired (the horns, the eyesight, the agility, the 
musculature, the wool) except as created in this arduous environment. After 
a hunt on Mount Shasta, Muir examines closely the carcasses of a dead ram 
and ewe, and, repentant and chagrined by his kill, shouts, "Well done for 
wildness!"31 
What is this struggle but a history of transvaluing disvalues into 
values? Disvalues and values are both objectively present in nature 
(regardless of human evaluators), nor is the struggle a zero sum game, nor 
null of value; rather, the struggle is prolific creativity. 
11. Suffering 
Over evolutionary history, with the diversity, complexity, and creativi-
ty we have celebrated, there emerges the capacity to suffer. Indeed the story 
could be titled, perversely, "The Evolution of Suffering." Each seeming 
advance—from plants to animals, from instinct to learning, from ganglia to 
brains, from sentience to self-awareness, from herbivores to car-
nivores—steps up the pain. In the planetary drama, struggle deepens 
through time into suffering. In chemistry, physics, astronomy, geomor-
phology, meteorology, nothing suffers; in botany life is stressed, but only in 
zoology does pain emerge. Is not this the evolution of increasing disvalue? 
We are not much troubled by seeds that fail, but it is difficult to avoid 
pity for nestling birds fallen to the ground. In every season, most of the sen-
tient young starve, are eaten, abused, abandoned. Wolves can get at the 
rump of a deer (avoiding the antlers); they may half-hamstring the deer and 
eat at it from behind. Sometimes a deer gets away with a hunk of its anus 
eaten out, to die slowly afterward. The Greek root for suffering is 
"pathos"; there are pathologies in nature, such as the diseases of 
parasitism, noted earlier. But pathology is only part of the disvalue; even in 
health there is suffering. Life is indisputably prolific; it is just as in-
disputably pathetic, almost as if its logos were pathos, as if the whole of 
sentient nature were pathological. "Horribly cruel!" exclaimed Darwin. 
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We are trying not to be anthropocentric in our evaluation of nature; 
this means that animal suffering counts. This means also, however, that the 
human experience of suffering must not be projected indiscriminately onto 
the animal world. Suffering in some sense seems copresent with neural 
structures; there are endorphins in earthworms, which indicates both that 
they suffer and that they are provided with pain buffers.52 A safe 
generalization is that pain becomes less intense as we go down the 
phylogenetic spectrum and is often not as acute in the nonhuman world. It 
is a mistake to view the sufferings of animals, birds, replies too an-
thropopathically, too subjectively. Birds and reptiles typically have fewer 
nerve endings per surface area of skin, for instance; and the level of con-
sciousness, self-awareness, or experience, or whatever is the proper name 
for their experiential state, is very different from, more subdued than, less 
intense and coherent than our own. 
Nevertheless pain is objectively present, and is it sheer disvalue? A 
more adequate answer is that, just as struggle is the dark side of creativity, 
pain is logically and empirically the shadow side of pleasure; one cannot en-
joy a world in which one cannot suffer, any more than one can succeed in a 
world in which one cannot fail. The logic here is not so much formal or 
universal as it is dialectical and narrative. In natural history—whatever 
might be true in other imaginable worlds—the pathway to psychosomatic 
consciousness, the only kind of experience we know, is through flesh that 
can feel its way through that world. There is some sentience without much 
capacity to be pained by it; we do not much suffer through our eyes or ears. 
But neither would we have those eyes and ears had they not evolved for the 
protection of the kinesthetic core of an experiential life that can suffer, 
whether by lack of food for which eyes may search or by predators whom 
ears may hear. We recouple here with the claims made about predation; 
levels of achievement and experience are generated in both predator and 
prey not otherwise possible. 
The capacity to suffer is generally accompanied by possibilities of 
avoiding suffering, some freedom and self-assertion. The capacity to suffer, 
for instance, drives the capacity for learned behavior; it brings animal life to 
a central focus in sentient consciousness. This does not and cannot happen 
in plants. Thought appears in order to prevent pain and to affirm wellbeing, 
but the thought that cannot feel pain cannot figure out how to escape it. In 
humans, this evolution of thought seeking comfort drives the transition and 
exodus from nature to culture. 
Pain is eminently useful in survival, and it will be naturally selected, on 
average, as functional pain.  Natural selection requires pain as much as 
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pleasure in the construction of concern and caring; pain is an alarm system 
in a world where there are helps and hurts through which a sentient 
organism must move. On the other hand, any population whose members 
are constantly in counterproductive pain will be selected against and go ex-
tinct or develop some capacities to minimize it. In this sense, natural selec-
tion, so far from needlessly increasing pain, rather trims it back in the 
system, so far as the system can remain vital—both conserving past vitalities 
and developing new ones. Pain is self-eliminating except insofar as it is in-
strumental of a subsequent, functional good. Intrinsic pain has no logical or 
empirical place in the system, neither does maladaptive pain. We cannot 
show this in the detail of every case; perhaps we need not expect it to be true 
in every case, and there are troublesome anomalies. Nevertheless, the 
system statistically must select for beneficial pain. 
12. Death 
Life is the first mystery that comes out of Earthen nature, and death a 
secondary one. But death comes as surely as life to all higher organisms. 
Even the lower forms that reproduce by cell fission or plant genets that pro-
duce ramets may and do die. So the great value, life, is countered by the 
great disvalue, death; and have we again a zero sum game? For each 
organism, the last word is destruction. 
But we are trying to see nature systemically, where death is not the last 
word—at least it has never yet been across three and a half billion years. 
Death is the key to replacement with new life. If nothing much had ever 
died, nothing much could have ever lived. Just as the individual overtakes, 
assimilates to itself, and discards its resource materials, so the evolutionary 
wave is propagated onward, using and sacrificing particular individuals, 
which are employed in, but readily abandoned to, the larger currents of life. 
Thus the prolife evolution both overleaps death and seems impossible 
without it. 
The vast number of creatures sprouted, hatched, or born, are, of 
necessity, more or less well-endowed genetically and emplaced in a more or 
less congenial environment, despite or including the fact that in their en-
vironment they are spurred to earn their way. Even though most will not 
live to maturity, their task is a reasonable natural ideal, a telos for which 
they are competently programmed. There are lethal mutants and 
monstrosities, but these bad ideas, as it were, are aborted immediately 
without further experiment. Organisms survive in about that proportion in 
which they are viable, so that life is sustained in any individual in relative 
proportion to its fitness for it. 
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A community of life is systemically sustained, and this requires value 
capture as nutrients, energy, and skills are shuttled round the trophic 
pyramids. This anastomosing of life threads characterizes an ecosystem. 
The surplus of young is efficiently used as resource material in alternative 
life courses and is thus doubly beneficial, permitting both mutational, cyber-
netic advance and the interdependent synthesis of biotic materials with 
higher forms at the top of the pyramid. Overlaid on these interconversions 
natural selection edits life for evolutionary advance. There is the creation 
and conservation of life. Death in vivo is death ultimately; death in com-
munitate is death penultimately but life regenerated ultimately. 
Individual organisms must die; many of them (as though the genes had 
accepted this inevitability) are programmed to die. Annual plants die when 
they make fruit. Most anadromous fishes die after breeding, as do many 
mollusks, annelids, and insects. In mayflies and in some male salmon, and 
in some squids, the gut atrophies prior to the onset of breeding and the 
organism can no longer eat. It only remains to breed, and die. In this built-
in senescence, the cycle of births and deaths is not a disvalue, or if it is, it is 
a disvalue that is overcome by valuable achievement that overleaps it. 
Reproduction necessitates death as much as does death necessitate repro-
duction. 
Even if death is not preprogrammed, it is inevitable because of aging. 
Since life ages, a process that is not well understood, it can be perpetuated 
only by regeneration. This regeneration must be with variation, if there is to 
be creative advance or even tracking of changing environments. Death is 
part of the life cycle, not life part of the death cycle. But when nature-
hostile from the perspective of the slain—regenerates and regularly ele-
vates life from the perspective of the community, is that a disvalue? When 
natural selection cuts away what does not fit and leaves what is better adapt-
ed, is that a disvalue? 
Species do not have to die; their extinction is never programmed. Most, 
of course, do die. Ninety eight percent of all species that have ever existed 
did go extinct, so there are high probabilities, but there is no law of nature 
or inevitability about species extinction. But here a puzzling aspect of the 
matter strikes us. The death of the organism feeds into the nondeath of the 
species. Only by replacements can the species track the changing environ-
ment; only by replacements can they evolve into something else. Species 
sometimes do die, go extinct without issue, but they are often transformed 
into something else, new species; and, on average, there have been more ar-
rivals than extinctions—the increase of both diversity and complexity over 
evolutionary history. We think of the extinction of species as tragic, if an-
thropogenic, because there is loss of birth as well as of death.  But the loss of 
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species in natural systems has meant more birth than death; perhaps there 
too it is tragic, but it is not unredeemed tragedy. Death is not the last word; 
death is transvalued into life. 
13. Systemic value 
Nature is random, contingent, blind, disastrous, wasteful, indifferent, 
selfish, cruel, clumsy, ugly, struggling, full of suffering, and, ultimately, 
death? This sees only the shadows, and there has to be light to cast shadows. 
Nature is orderly, prolific, efficient, selecting for adapted fit, exuberant, 
complex, diverse, renews life in the midst of death, struggling through to 
something higher. There are disvalues as surely as there are values, and the 
disvalues systemically drive the value achievements. We miss this panoramic 
creativity when we restrict value to human consciousness; we make value a 
prisoner of the particular sort of experiential biology and psychology that 
humans happen to have, or even of the particular sort of culture that 
humans happen to have chosen. There is every reason to value what we 
humans have achieved in our particular biology, sponsoring the emergence 
of culture as this biology does; there is no reason to think that value lies 
there and there alone. 
All those who find nature to be disvaluable are making objective 
claims, and they are eventually wrong, not about the form of their claims, 
for they do try to make objective claims, nor altogether about the content of 
their claims, for they are locally right. Only they are systematically mistaken 
in evaluating what they describe, because their descriptions are myopic. 
Both objectively and globally there is both disvalue and value, and the 
transmuting of disvalue into value. Such nature is of systemic value, and a 
better description of what is objectively taking place makes this better 
evaluation possible, an evaluation that is as objective as is the description. 
In this evaluation, we have not painted the world as better than it is in 
the interests of a philosophical metaphysics, nor worse either; rather we 
have tried to see into the depths of what is taking place in natural history. 
The view here is not panglossian; it is a sometimes tragic view of life, but 
one in which tragedy is the shadow of prolific creativity. That is the case, 
and the biological sciences—evolutionary history, ecology, molecular 
biology—can be brought to support this view, although neither tragedy nor 
creativity are part of their ordinary vocabulary. Since the world we have, in 
its general character, is the only world logically and empirically possible 
under the natural givens on Earth—so far as we can see at these native 
ranges that we inhabit—such a world ought also to be. 
Annie Dillard explodes with horror over her Earth story. "I came from 
the world, I crawled out of a sea of amino acids, and now I must whirl 
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around and shake my fist at that sea and cry Shame."53 If I were Aphrodite, 
rising from the sea, I think I would turn back to reflect on that event and 
rather raise both hands and cheer. And if I came to realize that this rising 
out of the misty seas involved a long struggle of life renewed in the midst of 
its perpetual perishing, I might fall to my knees in praise. 
Holmes Rolston, III 
Colorado State University 
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